Stumbling Into War?
“Human beings, like plans, prove fallible in the presence of those ingredients that are missing in [war] maneuvers - danger, death, and live ammunition,” Barbara Tuchman noted in The Guns of August. Her masterful history of the faulty assumptions and miscalculations that led to World War I and its 68 million casualties should give us pause. Watching events in Ukraine should make us ask if we are stumbling into another war as did Germany, Austria-Hungary, France Russia and England in 1914.
While the United States was a late entrant into the Great War, it has not been immune from faulty thinking in some of its own foreign conflicts. The tragedy of Vietnam was propelled by misunderstanding the history of that nation, the assumption that modern military might could prevail over a “backwards” peasantry and a president determined not to be the first to lose a war. We stumbled into Iraq in 2003 with the assumption we could spread democracy only to find that military victory led to a failed peace and years of the loss of American troops and treasure. We entered Afghanistan to find a terrorist and spent two decades pursuing nation-building before turning it back to the enemy we thought we could easily defeat.
When Russia invaded Ukraine, it expected a short war – a colossal miscalculation of its own. Our response – and with our leadership the West’s response – has been to help Ukraine defend itself. This is both appropriate and necessary. Yet wisdom is difficult in the midst of war as emotions too often thrust reason to the sidelines. In the last month, President Biden’s goals have expanded beyond Ukraine’s defense. He branded Vladimir Putin a war criminal; though true, this sounds like a desire for regime change. The president now cites “weaken Russia” as an aim, clearly going beyond just the defense of Ukraine, and the U.S. now is favoring expanding NATO to include Sweden and Finland.
In his Farewell Address, George Washington warned that “[t]he nation which indulges towards another a habitual hatred or a habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest.” In our rush to support Ukraine, we would be remiss in not asking questions to confirm our “duty and interest.” “Arguments can always be found to turn desire into policy,” Tuchman wrote, and that seems to be what we are doing.
These are times that demand cold, hard reason as well as emotion and resolve. We have been in such situations before and found it. Truman and Eisenhower pursued the rebuilding of Europe through the Marshall Plan, created NATO and then crafted a policy of containment of the Soviet Union, avoiding escalation into war. Truman relieved General Douglas Macarthur in Korea rather than allow him to carry that war into China, a move with unpredictable consequences for which the U.S. was most unprepared, focused as it needed to be on European security and containing the Soviets. Kennedy rejected military proposals to bomb and invade Cuba in October 1962, choosing instead a blockade and diplomatic path to avoid global thermonuclear war. George H.W. Bush pushed Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait but then stopped, forgoing the goal of conquering Iraq and destabilizing the entire region.
History should make us wary of the simplistic thinking - regime change and weakening adversaries. We helped depose Khadafy and Saddam Hussein, but neither peace nor democracy came in their wake. Through sanctions, we have weakened Iran, North Korea and now Russia, among others, but it would be hard to argue that this alone is the end point of a sound foreign policy.
Americans, including leaders in both political parties, seem united in our current approach to the war in Ukraine. Unanimity in foreign policy is desirable, but it should follow not precede tough thinking and serious debate. When the conversation is all about war, weapons and winning, there is little room for the hard work of restoring and securing peace. Among the questions that demand attention are: (1) how can the fighting be stopped, (2) what kind of settlement of the war is both reasonable and just, (3) what are the limits of American involvement, (4) what sacrifices are needed from the American people to pay for the support and rebuilding of Ukraine, (5) how can the NATO alliance be strong and not at the same time be seen as a threat by Russia, and (6) what are the long-term policy goals of the United States in Eastern Europe, and (7) how can we reintegrate a hopefully chastened Russia into the community of nations?
Barbara Tuchman would later write another book, The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam, chronicling “the pursuit by governments of policies contrary to their own interests.” Reflecting on the illusions which led leaders into disaster, she observed that: “Confronted by menace or what is perceived as menace, governments will usually attempt to smash it, rarely to examine it, understand it, and define it.” That is the warning – and challenge – we face.
Photo Credit: ELG21@pixabay.com
