Memorial Day and the Fog of War
In recent weeks, the U. S. has increased military assets in the Middle East and planning estimates for a possible war with Iran were reported. Intelligence suggests that Iranian boats may be carrying missiles. National Security Advisor John Bolton has previously argued for bombing Iran, a tactic encouraged by Israel's Benjamin Netanyahu. The Iranians are not benign actors in the region and beyond. Opportunities for miscalculation on both sides are increasing.
Wars are easier to get into than out of, costlier than expected, and often triggered by ambiguous events and leaders who recoil at appearing weak. Fearful of backing down, nations may back into war. As Memorial Day approaches, it is worth recalling lessons from another war.
At the end of 1963, the United States had 16,300 "advisers" in South Vietnam. By the end of 1968, the troop total was 536,100. America lost 58,209 soldiers in Vietnam. A pivotal moment came in the Tonkin Gulf, off the coast of North Vietnam, in August 1964.
On August 2, the crew of the USS Maddox reported an attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. Guessing it had not been authorized by the North Vietnamese government, the United States did not respond militarily. Then, on August 4, another attack seemed to be taking place. President Johnson ordered a military response. Congress overwhelmingly passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing the president to “take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack.”
Reflecting on this years later, the then-Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara reported that in 1995, "I learned in a meeting in Hanoi with General Vo Nguyen Giap, North Vietnam Defense Minister during the war, that the presumed attack on August 4 did not occur."
In a 2003 documentary, The Fog of War, McNamara acknowledged lessons he learned from Vietnam and other experiences. Reflecting on the Gulf of Tonkin was lesson #7: "Belief and seeing are often both wrong." Of the second "attack," he said: "We were wrong but had it in our minds and mindset" that it must have happened. He also admitted the U.S. misunderstood North Vietnam's aims. As historian Barbara Tuchman said in The March of Folly:
"Having invented Indochina as the main target of a coordinated Communist aggression, and having in every policy advice and public pronouncement repeated the operating assumption that its preservation from Communism was vital to American security, the United States was lodged in the trap of its own propaganda."
What really happened in the Gulf of Tonkin is now clearer. After the verified attack on August 2, the USS Turner Joy was added to U.S. assets in the gulf.
At 7:40 am (Washington time), August 4, the Maddox sent a message that an attack was imminent. As McNamara reported in In Retrospect:
"Low clouds and thunderstorms on this moonless night made visibility extremely difficult. During the next several hours, confusion reigned. . .The Maddox and Turner Joy reported more than twenty torpedo attacks . . . automatic weapons fire, and radar and sonar contacts. . . . "
Yet doubt persisted. Indeed at 1:27 pm, Captain John Herrick aboard the Maddox sent the following message:
"Review of action makes many reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful. Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonar men may have accounted for many reports. No actual visual sightings by Maddox."
Less than an hour later, Admiral Sharp in Honolulu reported there was "no doubt" an attack had occurred. Then Herrick, at 2:48 pm, sent another message: "Certain that original ambush was bona fide."
At 6:15 pm, despite still-conflicting information, the National Security Council concluded there was an attack,, and President Johnson ordered naval aircraft to attack North Vietnamese patrol boat bases and a supporting oil complex. As McGeorge Bundy, Johnson's National Security Advisor recalled years later "Kennedy didn't want to be dumb" and had thus avoided escalating in Vietnam. Yet "Johnson didn't want to be a coward."
Johnson then asked Bundy for a draft resolution for Congress. "Mr. President," Bundy replied, "we ought to think about this." "I didn't say that," Johnson responded. "I didn't ask you what you thought, I told you what to do."
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution Americanized the war. In his memoir, Bundy called the Gulf of Tonkin affair "a vaudeville show . . . it's all done with smoke and mirrors."
The current situation with Iran is not necessarily analogous, but the need to think clearly about matters of war and peace is. When the fog of war meets the mental fog of conflicting information, personality-driven motives, and a rush to judgment, the consequences can be tragic.
After the end of World War II, General George C. Marshall led the American Battle Monuments Commission. When he won the Nobel Peace Prize, the first career solider to do so, he said "[T]he cost of war in human lives is constantly spread before me, written neatly in many ledgers whose columns are gravestones. I am deeply moved to find some means or method of avoiding another calamity of war." Memorial Day is a good time to remember his words.
Photo Credit: Carol Donsky Newell
